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Abstract
We investigate whether public and private providers di¤er in quality in Lombardy, a large
Italian region. This region has adopted an internal market model where public and private
providers are paid by DRG and compete for publicly-funded patients for both elective and
emergency treatments. Using a large administrative sample in 2012-14, we measure clinical
quality with 30-day mortality for the following emergency conditions: heart attack (AMI), stroke
(ischemic and haemorrhagic) and hip fracture. For elective care, where mortality is negligible,
we measure 30-day emergency readmission rates for hip replacement and knee replacement.
Public and private hospitals may compete not only on clinical quality, but also on non-clinical
aspects of patients experience. We investigate whether private providers have shorter waiting
times for hip and knee replacements. To control for unobserved di¤erences in casemix between
public and private providers we pursue an instrumental variable approach based on the distance
between patients residence and the closest public and private provider: longer distances to the
closest private and public hospital are highly signicant determinants of whether the patient is
treated by a private versus a public provider. We nd, with few exceptions, that public and
private providers generally do not di¤er in elective and emergency quality, neither in waiting
times. The only exception is AMI for which mortality risk is lower in private providers, and hip
replacement for which readmission risk is higher in private providers.
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1 Introduction
Countries across the OECD di¤er systematically in the public-private mix in the provision of
hospital services to publicly-funded patients (Barros and Siciliani, 2011). In some countries, like
the United Kingdom and Norway, the vast majority of hospitals is public. In these countries, while
private providers increasingly treat publicly-funded patients, they only treat a relatively small
proportion of them and limit their services to elective (non-emergency) care (Siciliani et al., 2017).
For example, in England in 2013 only 4.5 per cent of elective treatments were provided by private
providers (Moscelli et al., 2018).
In other countries, such as the US, France, Germany and Italy, private providers are more
prominent. In the US, around 60 per cent of hospitals are private not-for-prot, 20 per cent are
private for-prot, and 20 per cent are public. In Italy about 28 per cent of hospitals are private, in
France, about 60 per cent of providers are private, while in Germany 70 per cent of hospitals are
private, half of which is for-prot. At the extreme of this wide spectrum we nd the Netherlands
where all providers are private. In these countries, private hospitals provide both elective (i.e., non-
emergency) and emergency treatments, thus competing on a whole range of health care services.
In the last two decades, several healthcare reforms have been implemented in European countries
mostly aimed at rationalising the use and provision of hospital care, improving its quality and
appropriateness and reducing its costs. In the same period, we observe a more signicant role of
private sector provision of healthcare even in countries with National Health Services.
The extent to which entry of private providers should be encouraged or facilitated is often the
subject of an intense political debate. A key element in deciding whether policy makers should
involve private providers is the extent to which they provide better or worse quality than public
providers. Economic theory provides mixed predictions on whether private hospitals provide higher
or lower quality than public hospitals. The literature has identied di¤erent mechanisms that go in
opposite direction. On one hand, because private hospitals have a stronger incentives to maximise
prots, they might skimp on quality to obtain a higher nancial surplus. On the other hand,
precisely because they are more prot oriented, they have a stronger incentive to compete for
demand by raising quality if demand is su¢ciently elastic. Moreover, public hospitals may be able
to attract more motivated workers who have a stronger preference for quality (Sloan, 2000; Glaeser
and Shleifer, 2001; Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2006; Brekke et al., 2012).
The existing empirical literature on the impact of hospital ownership on quality also provides
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contrasting results. For the US, the systematic review by Eggleston et al. (2008) suggests that
whether for-prot hospitals provide higher quality depends on the region, the data source and the
period of analysis. Other studies, such as Picone et al. (2002) and Shen (2002) investigate the e¤ect
of ownership conversions and nd that mortality increased in hospitals that changed from non-prot
to for-prot status. For Australia, there is evidence that private hospitals provide higher quality
in terms of lower unplanned readmission and mortality rates (Jensen et al., 2009). For France,
Milcent (2005) nds that, after controlling for observable di¤erences in severity, public hospitals
and private not-for-prot hospitals have similar AMI mortality. Private for-prot hospitals have
instead lower AMI mortality rate. In the period investigated, public and private not-for-prot
hospitals were paid by a global budget, with the revenue of each public hospital was determined
administratively on a historical basis, and private for-prot hospitals were paid by fee-for-service.
Lien et al. (2008) nds that non-for prot hospitals have better quality that for-prot hospitals
in Taiwan with quality being measured by mortality for stroke and cardiac treatment. Moscelli et
al. (2018) nd that private hospitals in England have similar quality, as measured by emergency
readmission rates for elective treatments, to public hospitals. Perotin et al. (2013) nd no di¤erence
in patient satisfaction between public and private hospitals in England, while Chard et al. (2011)
report that private treatment centres in 2008/9 had higher quality for hip and knee and similar
quality for varicose vein and hernia surgery. In summary, the evidence suggests that results di¤er
both within and across health systems.
In this study we investigate empirically whether there are di¤erences in healthcare quality
between public and private hospitals treating publicly-funded patients in Italy, who seek elective
(planned, non-emergency) treatments, and emergency treatments. We use administrative data on
patients admitted to 189 Italian hospitals located in the Lombardy region, in the years from 2012
to 2014. Lombardy is a large Italian region having a population of about 10 million inhabitants.
Similarly to the US, France and Germany, private providers are prominent in Lombardy, and
provide both elective and emergency care. They account for about 50 per cent of providers, though
they are generally smaller in size than public providers. Most of them are for-prot hospitals, with
the number of non-prot hospitals, often with a religious a¢liation, declining over time. Given that
the price is xed and is the same for public and private hospitals, providers compete on quality to
attract patients, and money follows the patient.
In our empirical investigation we conduct a comprehensive comparison of quality between public
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and private hospitals across di¤erent dimensions of emergency and elective care. We measure clinical
quality with 30-day mortality from patient admission for a set of emergency conditions, namely,
heart attack (AMI), stroke (ischemic and haemorrhagic) and hip fracture. For elective care, where
mortality is negligible, we measure clinical quality with 30-day emergency readmission rates for
hip replacement and knee replacement. Public and private hospitals may compete not only on
clinical quality, but also on non-clinical aspects of patients experience. One key aspect of patient
responsiveness is how long patients have to wait to obtain treatment. Waiting times for elective
treatments are a key concern across many publicly-funded health systems (Siciliani et al., 2013).
We therefore investigate whether private providers have a stronger incentive to keep waiting times
short for two common elective treatments, such as hip and knee replacements.
One methodological concern in comparing quality for public and private providers is that,
driven by their prot motive, private providers may have a stronger nancial incentive to avoid
costly patients (e.g. whose cost is above the DRG tari¤). To control for di¤erent case-mix we
include a range of control variables, such as age, gender, Elixhauser comorbidities, and number of
procedures. To control for unobserved di¤erences in casemix we pursue an instrumental variable
approach, which is similar to Lien et al. (2008) and Moscelli et al. (2018).
To instrument for the choice between a public and a private provider, we use the geographical
distance of the patients residence to the nearest public and nearest private hospital. The idea is
that a longer distance to the closest private provider makes the patient less likely to be treated
by a private hospital, while a longer distance to the closest public provider makes it more likely
to be treated by a private hospital. We indeed nd that the distance to the closest private and
public hospital are highly signicant determinants of whether the patient is treated by a private
versus a public provider. This nding is consistent with empirical literature on patient choice which
nds that distances to hospitals are a strong predictors of choice of hospital (e.g. Gaynor et al.,
2016) and the theory literature on hospital incentives where patient demand is modelled within a
Hotelling or Salop framework, where patients trade-o¤ distance against provider quality (Brekke
et al., 2011; 2012).
Our key ndings in relation to quality di¤erences between public and private providers are
as follows. For emergency conditions, OLS results suggest that mortality rates are signicantly
lower (both statistically and economically) for private hospitals, but this is not the case under our
instrumental-variable approach except for AMI where mortality is still lower for private hospitals
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after instrumenting. For elective conditions, our OLS results suggest no signicant di¤erence in
coronary bypass mortality and in readmission for hip and knee replacement. These di¤erences
remain insignicant under the instrumental variable approach except for hip replacement where
the readmission risk is higher for private hospitals. OLS suggests that waiting times are lower
for private hospitals, while they are insignicant under the instrumental variable approach. As a
whole, our results suggests that the evidence on whether private hospitals provide higher quality
than public hospitals is mixed. Although several outcomes do not di¤er, AMI mortality risk is
lower in private providers, and readmission risk for hip replacement is higher in private providers.
Our study makes a number of contributions to the existing literature on the e¤ect of hospital
ownership on quality. First, most of the literature is from US, while less is known about European
countries. The health system in the US di¤ers from other OECD countries, given the prominence
of private health insurance, which is voluntary for individuals not covered by Medicare or Medicaid.
Within European countries, there is evidence from England and France. However, as mentioned
above, private providers in England only specialise in elective treatment, and treat a small propor-
tion of publicly-funded patients. Therefore, a comparison for emergency care is not possible. Our
study instead covers both elective and emergency care, and as far as the authors are aware, it is the
rst study which compares quality provision of public and private providers in Italy. The institu-
tional set-up in Lombardy is also appealing, since public and private providers are paid according
to the same DRG tari¤, and therefore di¤erences in quality cannot be attributed to di¤erences in
payment rules.
Second, this is one of the rst studies which investigates di¤erences in waiting times between
public and private providers. Waiting times are a salient health policy issue, and it is therefore
surprising that there is lack of literature on this important dimension of patient experience. This
is likely due to lack of adequate data or policy interest (for example in the US waiting times are
relatively short and are not perceived as a policy issue). Bjorvatn (2018) compares patient casemix
between public and private hospitals treating patients with cardiovascular conditions in Norway and
nds that private hospitals have for some DRGs lighter casemix and tend to specialise. Although
it is not the focus of the analysis, the study nds that private hospitals have shorter waiting times
for cardiovascular conditions.
Third, to motivate and guide our empirical analysis, we provide a theoretical framework which
expands the one provided by Brekke et al. (2012). Di¤erently from their model, we allow both
5
public and private providers to compete in the same market. The model highlights the interactions
between the two types of providers, in addition to predicting how prot motives a¤ect the provision
of quality.
Although our focus is on di¤erences in hospital quality by type of ownership, the study relates
also to the literature on patient choice and hospital competition. The rst stage regression of choice
between public and private provider is a reduced form of a patient choice model with distance as its
key determinant. There is an extensive literature from the US and, to a lower extent, other OECD
countries that models patient choice of each hospital against distance and some quality (process or
structure) measures, commonly operationalised with a conditional logit model, and typically nds
that the demand responds to quality but the demand elasticity is low (see Gaynor et al., 2016;
Gutacker et al., 2016; Moscelli et al., 2016, and references therein).1
The study is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief institutional background. Section
3 develops a theoretical framework. Section 4 illustrates methods and the data. Section 5 discusses
the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional background
The Italian National Health Service provides universal healthcare coverage. The health system is
highly decentralized. Health funding is transferred to the regional governments that are responsible
for the organisation and management of their health services through local purchasers of health
services. The 20 regions enjoy signicant autonomy in determining the structure and functioning
of their health systems within the general framework designed at the national level. The national
framework is developed under the form of guidelines which establish the Basic Levels of Care
("Livelli Essenziali di Assistenza").
The Lombardy region was the rst in 1997 to implement an innovative quasi market model that
introduces and promotes competition among healthcare providers (regional law 31/1997). The aim
of the policy was to improve the quality of services, and at the same time to controlling the rise of
health expenditure. The main features of the reform were: the separation between purchasers and
providers, competition between public and private accredited providers in the presence of at third-
party payer, and patients freedom of choice between providers. More precisely, the reform has
1 In our rst stage regression we do not include quality as a regressor since this is our main outcome variable in
the second stage regression.
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introduced a split between Local Health Authorities (LHAs), the local purchasers, and hospitals.
LHAs are responsible for programming, nancing and monitoring the quality and quantity of NHS
activities in their target area.
The health reform has introduced competition between public and private providers by allowing
the latter to provide free healthcare under the condition that they satisfy minimum technology and
organizational standards set by the region. Private non-prot and for-prot hospitals that satisfy
such standards become "accredited" to provide care to publicly-funded patients free of charge.
Under these arrangements, patients are assigned to the LHA based on their place of residence but
have freedom of choice across all hospitals, both public and private.
Since 1995 the Lombardy region has implemented a nancing mechanism based on a Prospective
Payment System. It pays a predetermined xed tari¤ to the hospital for each patient treated
based on her Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG), which is identied through the clinical information
reported in the hospital discharge chart. The tari¤ for each DRG does not vary with the length
of stay if it falls within a given threshold. This type of xed price regulation induces hospitals to
compete primarily on quality. Although the region monitors the distribution of risk-adjusted quality
measures across hospitals through its quality evaluation programme, only hospital managers can
access such information. Therefore, quality competition relies on informal reputation mechanisms
(see Brenna, 2011, for further details about the Lombardy health system).
3 Economic theory
We model a hospital market with both public and private providers, and is adapted from Brekke et
al. (2012). Each public hospital i = 1; ::; I provides quality qui and each private hospital k = 1; :::;K
provides quality qrk. Patients choose hospitals based on the quality they provide. We assume that
health care is free at the point of consumption and there are no copayments. Therefore, quality is
a key determinant of hospital choice of the patient.
We assume that the demand function for public hospital i is
Dui (q
u
1 ; :::; q
u









with demand increasing in its own quality, @Dui =@q
u
i > 0, and decreasing in the quality of any other
hospital, either public or private, e.g. @Dui =@q
u




k < 0. If a hospital increases quality,
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more patients are likely to choose it. We assume that qualities are imperfect substitutes (due to
travelling costs and switching costs), j@Dui =@q
u




kj. Quality can a¤ect demand both
through informal mechanisms, such as word of mouth, or formal ones, such as public reporting.
Hospitals that have consistently higher quality build a reputation which is then transmitted between
patients through family, friends and informal networks. Primary care doctors who refer patients
to hospitals also advise patients based on their perceived quality which is based on the cumulated
experience of the numerous patients they attend every day. Therefore, quality a¤ects demand even
in the absence of public reporting.2
Similarly, the demand for private hospital k is
Drk(q
u
1 ; :::; q
u









with demand increasing in its own quality, @Drk=@q
r
k > 0, and decreasing in the quality of any other
hospital, either public or private. We write these demand functions in a more compact style as
Dui (q
u;qr); Drk(q
u;qr) with i = 1; ::; I and k = 1; :::;K; (3)
and qu = (qu1 ; :::; q
u
i ; :::; q
u
I ) is the vector of quality of public hospitals and q





the vector of quality of private hospitals. We assume that demand is separable in qualities.
The prot function of public hospital i is given by
ui (q
u;qr) = [p  cu(qui )]D
u
i (q
u;qr)  Cu (qui ) ; i = 1; :::; I; (4)
where p is a xed price per patient treated, cu(qui ) is the cost of treating a patient which we assume
to be increasing in quality, and Cu (qui ) is the xed cost of quality. Similarly, the prot function of
private hospital k is given by
rk(q
u;qr) = [p  cr(qrk)]D
r
k(q
u;qr)  Cr (quk ) ; k = 1; :::;K: (5)
We therefore allow the treatment costs of treating patients and the xed cost of quality to vary
2Quality is a multidimensional concept, and includes both clinical aspects of quality and amenities, such as
the comfort and size of the room, quality of the food, friendliness of reception, quality of the interiors (Dranove
and Satterthwaite, 2000). In this study, we focus on clinical aspects of the quality, since these are arguably more
important and also we do not have information on patient reported outcomes on patient experience.
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between public and private hospitals, cu(q) ? cr(q) and Cu(q) ? Cr(q). Di¤erences could arise as
a result of di¤erent organisational arrangements (e.g. e¢ciency of the operating theatre), which is
likely to a¤ect treatment costs, or di¤erent tendering processes, which is likely to a¤ect the xed
cost of quality through acquisition of expensive machines (e.g. MRI, CT scans).
Following the seminal study by Ellis and McGuire (1986), we model healthcare providers as
altruistic. More precisely, the payo¤ function of public hospital i is given by
V ui (q
u;qr) = (1  )ui (q
u;qr) + ub (qui )  g (q
u
i ) ; (6)
where u denotes the degree of altruism of intrinsic motivation from providing higher quality, and
b (qui ) is a patient benet function, which is increasing in quality. In addition to monetary costs,
we assume that there are non-monetary (e¤ort) costs associated with providing quality above
a minimum level (normalised to zero). These non-monetary costs are captured by the function
g (qui ), which is also increasing in quality. The parameter  2 [0; 1) reects the constraints imposed
by a regulator hospitals ability to distribute prots. Public hospitals cannot distribute prots in
cash but have to spend any positive net revenues on perquisites.3
Hospitals are complex organisations. The quality provided is the outcome of several agents
involved including doctors, nurses, the managers in charge of the hospital nances, and the protocols
agreed between medical and managerial sta¤. Doctors are likely to give higher weight to patients
benet than hospital managers. One possible interpretation of the weight given to patient benet,
u; is that this is the outcome of a negotiation between doctors and managers (Chone and Ma,
2011).
Similarly, the payo¤ function of private hospital k is given by
V rk (q
u;qr) = rk(q
u;qr) + rb (qri )  g (q
r
i ) : (7)
We therefore allow the degree of altruism to di¤er between public and private hospitals, u ? 0,
as it has been argued for example that public hospitals may be able to attract more motivated
employees.
We assume that quality is chosen simultaneously and independently (given that prices are xed,
3A similar approach is used by Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) and Ghatak and Mueller (2011) to model di¤erence
between non-prot and for-prot rms.
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quality is the only choice variable of the hospital). The rst-order conditions for public hospital
























































































The optimal quality is set such that the sum of the marginal monetary and non-monetary benets
(given by revenues and intrinsic motivation) is equal to the marginal monetary and non-monetary
(disutility) costs. A higher degree of altruism and lower treatment or xes costs tends to increase
quality.
Prot constraints reduce the relative weight given to nancial considerations as opposed to non-
nancial ones. We now investigate how an increase in prot constraints  a¤ects quality. Applying





















































where  and   are positive expressions that relate to the second order conditions of the problem,
 > 0 and   > 0:
The intuition behind the key result is as follows. The e¤ect of a lower weight on prots (i.e.
an increase in ) on the quality of public providers, given by (13) is in general indeterminate. It
depends on the relative magnitude of altruism relative to the marginal disutility of quality. If
altruism is low, then the marginal prot is positive, and a lower weight on prot reduces quality.
If altruism is high so that the marginal prot of quality is negative, then a lower weight on prot
increases quality. This is in line with the result of Brekke et al. (2012). Since qualities are strategic
complements, higher prot constraints by public hospitals also induces a change in quality by
private hospitals, as suggested by (14): an increase (reduction) in quality by public hospitals will
increase (reduce) quality by private hospitals.
From (12), we can also see that the optimal quality is a function of the equilibrium demand,
Du(qu;qr), and the demand responsiveness to quality, @Du(qu;qr)=@qui . In turn, these depend
(see (3)), on the number of public providers I and the number of private providers K: If we assume
that total demand across all hospitals is xed, an increase in the number of (public or private)
providers will increase the demand responsiveness to quality, making the market more competitive.
But because equilibrium quality di¤ers across public and private providers and qualities are strategic
complements, then the number of private providersK (or proportion of private providersK=(K+I))
will also a¤ect quality.
The key insights from the model are as follows. (i) Whether constraints on prots, a feature
of public hospitals, increases or reduces quality is in principle indeterminate, with higher altruism
(disutility) leading to prot constraints to increase (reduce) quality. Di¤erences in quality can
also be driven by di¤erences in degree of altruism, and di¤erences in treatment costs, with lower
costs leading to higher quality (since it increases price mark-up). (ii) Public and private hospitals
compete for the same patients; if prot constraints induce public hospitals to have higher (lower)
quality this also increases (reduces) the quality of private hospitals in the same market if qualities
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are strategic complements. In turn, this suggests that the quality of hospitals in a given market
depends on the number of hospitals in the market, but also the public-private mix of the market
(as for example captured by the number or the proportion of private hospitals).
4 Empirical model and data
We wish to estimate the e¤ect of hospital ownership on the quality of healthcare. To this end, we
consider the following empirical specication:




j+ "ij ; (15)
where yij is the health outcome for patient i admitted in hospital j; pij is a dummy variable
taking value of 1 if the hospital chosen by patient i is private; Sj a vector of variables related to
hospital characteristics (e.g. teaching hospital) and local market structure (number of competitors,
and proportion of private providers within a 30km catchment area); Xi is a vector of patients
characteristics that includes age, gender, morbidity (proxied by the Elixhauser comorbidity index),
the number of procedures, and a dummy for one of the thirteen provinces where the patient resides,
controlling for unobserved factors at the province level; "ij is the error term. Our key parameter of
interest is , which indicates whether private hospitals di¤er from public hospitals in the provision
of quality.
In estimating equation (15), one major concern is that unobservable characteristics, such as
patients morbidity, may be correlated with the choice of going to a private hospital, leading to
possible bias in the estimated coe¢cient. This is because private providers may have a stronger
nancial incentive to attract more protable and less severe patients (a practice also known as
cream skimming) than public ones and to avoid costly patients (Berta et al., 2010; Ellis, 1998).
To address this issue, we adopt an instrumental-variable approach. We follow the approach
outlined in Lien et al. (2008) and Moscelli et al. (2018) and take as instruments the geographical
distance of patient is place of residence to the nearest public hospital and its squared term and the
distance to the nearest private hospital and its squared term (McClellan et al., 1994; McClellan and
Newhouse, 1997; Sloan et al., 2001). The place of residence is measured as the centroid from one of
the (around) 1500 municipalities (the much smaller administrative geographical areas compared to
the twelve provinces). It is plausible to assume that, ceteris paribus, patients prefer to be admitted
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to hospitals that are geographically closer to their residence. Distance is systematically a strong,
if not the strongest, predictor in patient choice models (e.g. Gutacker et al., 2016 and Brekke
et al., 2014 for a review of the literature). The idea is that distance, conditional on locations of
patients and hospitals, while being a key driver of patients choice, is uncorrelated with unobserved
patient characteristics, particularly a patients severity upon admission. We estimate model (1)
by instrumental variables in the context of a linear probability model, although we also use Logit
estimation in a robustness check.
Our instrumental variable approach relies on the assumption that unobserved patient character-
istics are uncorrelated with (di¤erential) distance. This assumption may be invalid in the presence
of spatial sorting where individuals who are more likely to use healthcare services tend to live
near hospitals rather than far away from them. However, we do not think this is an issue within
the Italian context and our analysis, and this is also conrmed by the balance tables provided
in Section 4.2. Several of our health conditions are emergency ones (heart attack, hip fracture,
stroke) where it seems unlikely that individuals will predict they will be sick and move closer to a
hospital with higher quality. This is potentially more of an issue for hip and knee replacement, but
these are routine high-volume conditions that are provided once or twice in a lifetime, and again
it seems unlikely that individuals will be willing to move in order be closer to a specic hospital.
This is further reinforced within the Italian cultural context, where individuals have strong family
ties, and this, together with job opportunities (for those who are not retired), are the main drivers
of location decisions. Moreover, there are high taxes on selling or buying a house, which further
hampers mobility.
4.1 Data
We use administrative data on all patients admitted to any hospitals in Lombardy, in the years
from 2012 to 2014. Data on patients have been extracted from the Hospital Discharge Chart
available for each patient. These include socio-demographic patient characteristics such as age,
gender, and the municipality and the province of residence; clinical information (co-morbidities),
type of admission (elective or emergency), and mode of discharge. We also gathered information on
mortality of patients from the General Register O¢ce. The characteristics of the hospital include
its ownership (e.g. private or public), and teaching status. Most of private hospitals are for-prot,
and are bundled with non-prot hospitals that often have a religious a¢liation.
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We use nine measures of quality across both emergency and elective (non-emergency) admissions
to investigate whether results are sensitive to the type of admission. Patients requiring emergency
admission have very limited hospital choice, often determined by external factors such as bed
availability or the ambulance service. Five are based on mortality, two on hospital readmissions
and two on (inpatient) waiting times. For emergency admissions we measure mortality with a
dummy variable equal to one if the patient dies within 30 days from patient admission for acute
myocardial infarction (AMI), ischaemic and haemorragic stroke, and hip fracture.
For elective admissions we measure mortality (within 30 days from patient admission) for coro-
nary bypass. We do not measure mortality for hip replacement and knee replacement because it is
very low and therefore does not provide su¢cient variation to compare hospitals. We instead mea-
sure quality with a dummy variable equal to one if the patient is readmitted as an emergency within
30 days from discharge. We measure the inpatient waiting time (expressed in number of days) for
elective hip and knee replacement. Inpatient waiting time is dened as the time from which the
patient is added to the list to the time the patient is admitted to the hospital for treatment. The
DRG codes used to select the seven conditions are listed in the Appendix.
Among the control variables we include age in year bands (40-60, 60-70, 70-80, over 80, with
less than 40 used as the reference group), gender, the Elixhauser index (Elixhauser et al., 1998) and
the total number of procedures. We also have hospital characteristics, a dummy variable equal to
one if the patient is admitted in a teaching hospital, and two measures of local market structure: i)
the number of competitors providing the same treatment or condition, and ii) proportion of private
providers within a 30km catchment area.4 These were computed using hospital address and its
geographical coordinates to draw a xed radius of 30km and count the total number of hospitals
(public or private) falling into this radius, and the proportion of hospitals with private ownership.
We also control for province xed e¤ect measured at the patient level (i.e. a dummy equal to one
if the patient resides in one of the twelve provinces).
To implement our instrumental variable approach, for each patient we compute the straight-
line ellipsoidal distance between the patient residence (through the geographical coordinates of
the municipality where the patient resides) and the closest public hospital and private hospital
(through the geographical coordinates of hospital address). There are about 1500 municipalities in
Lombardy.
4The choice of a 30km radius is in line with previous work from England (Gaynor et al., 2013, and references
therein) and with a previous study on Lombardy which focuses on hospital competition (Berta et al., 2016).
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Before presenting the descriptive statistics, we motivate the choice of our outcome measures.
For emergency admissions, we focus on AMI (heart attack), stroke and hip fracture. AMI mortality
has been extensively used as a marker of hospital quality in particular in relation to the literature
investigating the e¤ect of hospital competition (e.g. Gaynor, 2006; Bloom et al., 2015). Stroke
causes 1012% of deaths across Western countries (Donnan et al., 2008). The lifetime risk of hip
fracture is 18% for women and 6% in men with an 30-day mortality of 6%. 20% of individuals die
within one year following a hip fracture, and 25% require long-term care (Gillespie, 2000).
For elective admissions, we focus on hip and knee replacement, two common elective treatments
for which the mortality rate is negligible. For these we instead focus on emergency readmissions
since these are commonly used as a performance indicator in the policy domain (e.g. within the
NHS Outcomes Framework in England; HSCIC, 2013) and is commonly used to measure quality
in the clinical literature (e.g. Blunt et al., 2015) and the health economics literature (e.g. Moscelli
et al., 2016). Finally, coronary artery bypass graft is a common elective surgical procedure to treat
individuals with heart disease with severe angina (chest pain) and at risk of a heart attack. The
mortality rate for this procedure is far from negligible, which combined with high volumes, makes
it a suitable quality indicator. For coronary bypass we do not measure instead readmissions due to
concerns of selection through mortality (i.e. a hospital may have a high readmission rate because it
is successful in reducing mortality, which in turn increases the severity of the patients who survive;
Laudicella et al., 2013).
4.2 Descriptive statistics
Tables 1a and 1b o¤er some descriptive statistics for each of the quality measures included in the
analysis. 30-day mortality for AMI is lower in private hospitals compared to public providers (6.6%
vs 9.4%). This is the case also for stroke, either ischaemic (10.7% vs 14%) or haemorragic (18%
vs 24.6%), and, to a lower extent, for hip fracture (5.1% vs 5.8%). 30-day mortality for elective
coronary bypass ranges between 1.2 and 1.3% for both types of providers. Emergency readmissions
rates for elective hip and knee replacements are about 3.6-4% with no clear pattern. Waiting times
appear to be shorter in private hospitals by about 20-30 days.
The number of private hospitals is comparable to the one for public hospitals. For emergency
admissions, the number of private or public hospitals is between 79 and 93 hospitals. However,
public hospitals treat at least two to three times as many patients than private hospitals. This is
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not the case for elective treatments. For hip and knee replacement, there are more public hospitals
(63-64) than private ones (46) but private hospitals treat more patients than public ones. This
may be the result of private providers specialising in a sub-set of high-volume elective procedures
to exploit scale economies, and o¤ering better amenities, while public hospitals have less scope
to specialise and are under the obligation of o¤ering a wider range of surgical procedures. For
coronary bypass, there is the same number of public and private hospitals but more patients are
treated by public providers, probably as a result of their larger size. The latter also suggests that
whether public or private providers are preferred depends on the treatment and various institutional
constraints and hospital congurations.
About 20-40% of patients across the sample (including the seven conditions) were treated in
teaching hospitals. On average, each hospital competed with 30-40 hospitals in their 30 km catch-
ment area of which around 30% were private.
The average distance from patient municipality of residence to the closest hospital (either public
or private) varies between 4 and 11.7 km, depending on the procedure, except for coronary bypass
for which it is higher for both public and private hospitals (respectively equal to 15 and 24.6 km)
possibly due to higher degree of hospital concentration and specialization.
Our instrumental variable approach relies on the assumption that patient characteristics do
not vary systematically with the distance to a private or public hospital. To investigate this
issue, we have carried a set of balance tests, by splitting patients into two groups, according to
two alternative denitions. First, we compare patient characteristics between patients for whom
the closest hospital is private (so that the di¤erential distance between the closest private and
public hospital is negative) and those patients whose closest hospital is public (and the di¤erential
distance between closest private and public hospitals is positive). Second, we compare patient
characteristics between patients whose di¤erential distance is below the median and those whose
di¤erential distance is above the median.
The results are reported in Table 1c. The di¤erence in the proportion of male patients between
those who are closest to a public and a private hospital (or those whose di¤erential distance is
below or above the median) is always less than 0.5 percentage points (except for coronary bypass
where it is still less than 1.5 pp, and around 4pp for hip and knee replacement only for the second
distance measure). Similarly, the di¤erence in age between the two groups is systematically below
one year. The di¤erence in the proportion of patients with Elixhauser comorbidities is less than
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2pp for most conditions. This proportion is higher for coronary bypass patients who live relatively
closer to private hospitals (by about 5-6 pp) but lower for patients with a hip fracture (by about
2-7pp). There is a positive di¤erence for AMI and ischaemic stroke patients (by respectively 3
and 8pp) but only when comparing patients whose di¤erential distance between closest private and
public is below and above the median, but there is no di¤erence for the same AMI and ischaemic
stroke patients when comparing those who live closest to a private hospital relative to a public
hospital. The number of interventions between the two groups is below 0.2 interventions in most
cases, and 0.25 for two conditions, and at most 0.45 for hischaemic stroke with more procedures for
those living closest to a private hospital but this di¤erences drops to -0.04 when comparing those
whose di¤erential distance is below or above the median. Overall, these results suggest that there
is no systematic relation between distance and observed patient characteristics.
5 Results
We rst present our rst stage regressions on the determinants of the probability of being treated
by a private or public provider as a function of distance and other patient characteristics, and then
present the second stage results on di¤erences in quality between public and private providers.
5.1 First stage regression
The rst stage regression results are reported in Table 2. They suggest that the distance to the
closest private and public hospital are highly signicant determinants of whether the patient is
treated by a private versus a public provider. One additional kilometer from patient residence
to the closest public hospital increases the probability of being treated by a private provider, at
the sample mean, by 1.2-1.3 percentage points. Similarly, one additional kilometer from patient
residence to the closest private hospital decreases the probability of being treated by a private
provider, at the sample mean, by 1.5-2.8 percentage points. The e¤ect of distance to the closest
hospital is non-linear and decreasing with distance. The results are consistent with the literature on
hospital patient choice, commonly operationalised with a conditional logit model, which suggests
that distance to each provider is the arguably the most important driver of patient choice (see
Gaynor et al., 2016; Gutacker et al., 2016; Moscelli et al., 2016, for evidence from the UK and
references therein for other OECD countries).
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For hip and knee replacement, we also nd that more severe patients with a higher Elixhauser
comorbidities index are less likely to be admitted to private hospitals. This is consistent with the
idea that private hospitals tend to treat relatively less severe patients either because of dumping,
cream-skimming, scale economies and specialisation in routine cases, or because they lack the
facilities to treat more severe patients (see Berta et al., 2010, for a more detailed discussion).
The rst stage regression results on the instruments appear relevant in that they have the rst
stage F statistics comfortably larger than the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical value of 16.38 for
type-1 error of 5% and a maximum 10% bias with respect to OLS.
5.2 Second stage regression
Tables 3a-3b provides the results from OLS and 2SLS regressions on the e¤ect of being treated by
a private hospital on the probability of dying or being readmitted within 30 days, conditional on
patient and hospital characteristics. The rst line provides the OLS coe¢cient, and the second line
the 2SLS one. We also report the coe¢cients associated to the covariates for the 2SLS regression.
Table 3a provides the results for 30-day mortality. In line with the descriptive statistics, OLS
results suggest that private hospitals have lower mortality rate for some emergency conditions such
as AMI (by 2.7 percentage points), ischemic stroke (3 pp), and haemorragic stroke (6.8 pp) and
the coe¢cients are signicant at 1 percent level. Private hospitals have also lower mortality for
coronary bypass and hip fracture mortality but they are not signicant at 5% level. However, once
instrumented the di¤erence in mortality between public and private hospitals is not signicant
anymore except for AMI mortality, where the di¤erence remains signicant at the 5% level with a
similar magnitude (3.5 pp).
The results in Table 3a suggest that for emergency conditions, unobserved severity can a¤ect the
comparison between public and private providers but the direction in which it does depends on the
condition. For hip fracture, haemorragic and ischemic stroke private providers have lighter casemix
which remains unobserved, and that once accounted for eliminates the di¤erence in quality across
public and private providers. However, for AMI, the pattern goes in the opposite direction, with
private providers having more severe unobserved patients, so that the gap in mortality between
public and private providers widens once accounted for. For coronary bypass, which is an elective
condition, unobserved dimensions of severity do not appear to matter, and quality remains similar
across public and private providers when accounting for unobserved severity.
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Table 3b provides the results for 30-day readmissions and waiting times for hip and knee replace-
ment. As for 30-day readmission rates, OLS results suggest no statistically signicant di¤erence
for hip and knee replacement. However, once private ownership is instrumented, the probability
of readmission for hip replacement is higher and statistically signicant in private hospitals by
3.6 percentage points. This is consistent with private providers having a lighter casemix along
dimensions which remain unobserved and not captured by the risk-adjustment.
OLS results also suggest that waiting times for hip and knee replacement are shorter in private
hospitals by about 25-35% but these di¤erences are not statistically signicant once we instrument
for the choice of provider type. In turn, this suggests that there are unobserved dimensions a¤ecting
the ability to wait that relate to severity, health and socioeconomic status (e.g. education) which
are correlated with both waiting times and the propensity to be treated at a private provider. For
example, patients who are self employed may have a higher disutility from waiting (given they
cannot work while waiting), be more severe and more likely to choose a private provider while
employees may have a lower disutility from waiting (since better covered by social security) and
more likely to opt for public hospitals.
The coe¢cients attached to the covariates, across all models, generally show the expected sign.
Gender seems not to play a role for most of mortalities except for hip fracture where mortality and
readmission rates are higher for male patients. Waiting time for knee replacement is also lower for
male patients. Mortality tends to increase with age but this is not the case for readmissions and
waiting times in most cases. The degree of hospital competition, as measured by the number of
hospitals within a 30km radius, as well as the percentage of private providers in the same catchment
area are generally insignicant. This result is in line with Berta et al. (2016), who nd no signicant
e¤ect of indices of competition on hospital quality.
5.3 Robustness checks
As a robustness check, we also re-estimated all models for mortality and readmission outcomes
adopting a logistic regression, as well as instrumenting the dummy variable for private ownership
with an IV logit approach. The results are reported in the Appendix, Table A1.
To allow for testing of multiple hypotheses, and the risk of false positives that arises from it,
we can correct the critical signicance level values. One option is to use the very conservative
Bonferroni correction, which divides the critical value by the number of hypotheses. With a critical
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value of 5% and nine outcomes, the Bonferroni critical value is 0.56% (less than 1% signicance
level). The OLS results are not a¤ected by this correction. This is because the coe¢cient on
private hospitals is either not signicant (for bypass and hip fracture mortality, and hip and knee
readmissions) or signicant at less than 0.1% level (AMI and stroke mortality, waiting times). In the
IV regressions, the coe¢cient is already statistically insignicant for all but two indicators, while it
is signicant only at 5% level for AMI mortality and hip replacement readmission. Unsurprisingly,
a more conservative critical value would make also these two coe¢cients insignicant.
6 Conclusions
We have investigated whether public and private providers di¤er in quality in a large Italian region
where public and private providers compete for publicly-funded patients under a common xed
price DRG payment system. Using a large sample in 2012-14, we nd, with few exceptions, that
public and private providers generally do not di¤er in elective and emergency quality, neither in
waiting times. The only exceptions are AMI for which mortality risk is lower in private providers,
and hip replacement for which readmission risk is higher in private providers.
A key methodological concern is that, driven by their prot motive, private providers may have
a stronger nancial incentive to avoid costly patients, which could lead to biased quality measures in
favour of the private providers. To control for di¤erent case-mix we have included a range of control
variables, and to control for unobserved di¤erences in casemix we have pursued an instrumental
variable approach based on the distance between patients residence and the closest public and
private provider.
We indeed nd that the distance to the closest private and public hospital are highly statistically
signicant determinants of whether the patient is treated by a private versus a public provider.
One additional kilometer from patient residence to the closest public (private) hospital increases
(reduces) the probability of being treated by a private provider by 1.2-1.3 (1.5-2.8) percentage
points.
By comparing the OLS with the IV results, we have shown that unobserved factors are im-
portant. OLS results suggest that mortality rates are signicantly lower (both statistically and
economically) for emergency conditions in private hospitals, but this is not the case under our
instrumental-variable approach except for AMI. This is also the case for our indicators of patient
responsiveness: OLS suggests that waiting times are lower for private hospitals, while they are
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insignicant under the instrumental variable approach.
Overall, our results suggests that when public and private hospitals are subject to the same
payment system, the evidence on whether private hospitals provide higher quality than public
hospitals is mixed. Although several outcomes do not di¤er, AMI mortality risk is lower in private
providers, and readmission risk for hip replacement is higher in private providers.
The result has policy implications for European countries who are moving towards expanding
the role of private providers to treat publicly-funded patients and for which there is a lack of
empirical evidence (in particular in relation to emergency conditions since private providers are
only contracted elective treatments). Given that public and private providers are paid the same
tari¤ for a given treatment, the cost to the purchaser of healthcare is the same and, as our analysis
suggests, the (clinical and non-clinical) quality provided is also the same. Whether involvement
of private provision should be expanded could then depend on capacity arguments but not on
quality considerations. For example, if a purchaser of health services needs to expand capacity
quickly to address higher needs, private providers may be able in the short run to absorb such
additional demand. Our results also show that the proportion of private providers in a market does
not a¤ect the quality of public (or private) providers, which in turn suggests that competition by
private providers in the health system does not impact on the ability to provide quality by public
providers.
Finally, the analysis suggests that casemix adjustment based on observable covariates is not
su¢cient to make quality indicators comparable across public and private hospitals, but it is possible
to correct for this through an instrumental variable approach based on distances between patients
address of residence and the closest hospitals, which is easily available to policymakers.
Our analysis is limited to the comparison of the average mortality and readmission rates across
public and private hospitals. There may be signicant heterogeneity both within public hospitals
and within private hospitals. Future research could further investigate the distribution of health
outcomes across the two sectors.
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Table 1a. Descriptive statistics by quality measure and hospital ownership
Variable AMI Bypass Ischaemic stroke Haemorragic stroke
Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public
N. patients 18031 41377 3314 4154 11375 27887 5532 13716
N. hospitals 91 81 10 10 85 92 83 93
30-day mortality 0.066 0.094 0.012 0.013 0.107 0.140 0.180 0.246
Teaching hospital 0.247 0.207 0.427 0.477 0.322 0.215 0.190 0.309
Male 0.640 0.638 0.815 0.812 0.496 0.486 0.535 0.522
Age group 40-60 0.212 0.216 0.202 0.220 0.108 0.104 0.145 0.161
Age group 60-70 0.211 0.214 0.342 0.338 0.161 0.160 0.169 0.163
Age group 70-80 0.283 0.276 0.382 0.364 0.318 0.317 0.309 0.311
Age over 80 0.281 0.282 0.069 0.072 0.400 0.403 0.345 0.331
Elixhauser comorb. 0.4228 0.4824 0.3742 0.3953 0.6174 0.5704 0.4219 0.4348
std err (0.7153) (0.7395) (0.7138) (0.7411) (0.7787) (0.7755) (0.6668) (0.6968)
N. of procedures 4.4430 4.1651 4.00780 3.7932 3.5189 3.2287 3.3838 2.9258
std err (1.5177) (1.8041) (1.4015) (1.4883) 1.8640 (1.8881) (1.8370) (1.8802)
Distance to nearest
hosp. (km)
10.315 4.767 24.628 15.043 9.156 4.469 9.502 4.310
N. hosp. in catch. 43.544 34.743 8.879 7.388 44.838 37.061 45.869 37.941
% priv. hospitals
in catch.
0.309 0.278 0.433 0.302 0.333 0.293 0.322 0.287
Notes: Standard deviations are provided in round brackets.
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Table 1b. Descriptive statistics by quality measure and hospital ownership
Variable Hip fracture Hip replacement Knee replacement
Private Public Private Public Private Public
N. patients 12760 31928 15327 10379 17125 8089
N. hospitals 79 84 46 64 46 63
30-day mortality 0.051 0.058 - - - -
Readmission - - 0.040 0.038 0.036 0.037
Teaching hospital 0.182 0.293 0.258 0.293 0.211 0.297
Male 0.248 0.252 0.442 0.462 0.317 0.325
Age group 40-60 0.044 0.046 0.194 0.174 0.124 0.106
Age group 60-70 0.074 0.075 0.301 0.279 0.331 0.323
Age group 70-80 0.247 0.257 0.381 0.409 0.451 0.483
Age over 80 0.626 0.613 0.106 0.117 0.088 0.083
Elixhauser comorb. 0.2905 0.2985 0.023 0.116 0.030 0.135
std err (0.6249) (0.6263) (0.177) (0.386) (0.204) (0.421)
N. of procedures 3.1260 2.5913 2.284 2.406 1.811 2.063
std err (1.8144) (1.5737) (1.250) (1.382) (1.367) (1.493)
Distance to nearest
hosp. (km)
8.405 4.021 11.716 5.536 11.285 5.518
N. hosp. in catch. 45.407 38.881 25.902 23.293 25.484 23.453
% priv. hospitals
in catch.
0.347 0.313 0.305 0.298 0.311 0.303
Waiting times 81.960 103.334 81.308 111.072
std err (67.054) (76.539) (67.783) (76.512)
Notes: Standard deviations are provided in round brackets.
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Table 1c. Balance test
AMI Bypass
(a): Di¤. (b): Di¤. (a): Di¤. (b): Di¤.
dist.<0 dist.>0 (a) - (b) dist.<0 dist.>0 (a) - (b)
Male 0.637 0.639 -0.002 0.822 0.807 0.015
Age 70.922 71.185 -0.263 67.735 67.908 -0.173
Elix. comorb. 0.46 0.466 -0.006 0.423 0.36 0.063
N. of interv. 4.438 4.189 0.249 3.819 3.938 -0.119
(a): Low (b): High (a): Low (b): High
di¤. dist. di¤. dist. (a) - (b) di¤. dist. di¤. dist. (a) - (b)
Male 0.635 0.642 -0.007 0.82 0.808 0.012
Age 71.345 70.911 0.434 67.768 67.89 -0.122
Elix. comorb. 0.48 0.449 0.031 0.413 0.364 0.049
N. of interv. 4.31 4.193 0.117 3.827 3.938 -0.111
Hischaemic stroke Haemorragic stroke
(a): Di¤. (b): Di¤. (a): Di¤. (b): Di¤.
dist.<0 dist.>0 (a) - (b) dist.<0 dist.>0 (a) - (b)
Male 0.491 0.488 0.003 0.524 0.526 -0.002
Age 75.088 75.712 -0.624 71.805 72.576 -0.771
Elix. comorb. 0.583 0.584 -0.001 0.419 0.435 -0.016
N. of interv. 3.657 3.204 0.453 3.255 3 0.255
(a): Low (b): High (a): Low (b): High
di¤. dist. di¤. dist. (a) - (b) di¤. dist. di¤. dist. (a) - (b)
Male 0.484 0.495 -0.011 0.521 0.53 -0.009
Age 75.92 75.179 0.741 72.826 71.969 0.857
Elix. comorb. 0.624 0.541 0.083 0.437 0.425 0.012
N. of interv. 3.292 3.335 -0.043 3.118 2.995 0.123
Notes: (): Di¤erential distance is dened as the di¤erence between the closest private hospital and the closest
public hospital for each patient. Di¤ential distance is dened as low when it is below the median di¤erential
distance, and is high when it is above the median.
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Table 1c (continued). Balance test
Hip fracture Hip replacement Knee replacement
(a): Di¤. (b): Di¤. (a): Di¤. (b): Di¤. (a): Di¤. (b): Di¤.
dist.<0 dist.>0 (a) - (b) dist.<0 dist.>0 (a) - (b) dist.<0 dist.>0 (a) - (b)
Male 0.247 0.251 -0.004 0.452 0.45 0.002 0.319 0.32 -0.001
Age 80.487 80.948 -0.461 68.254 68.645 -0.391 70.126 70.268 -0.142
Elix. comorb. 0.279 0.301 -0.022 0.053 0.063 -0.01 0.055 0.067 -0.012
N. of interv. 2.791 2.731 0.06 2.383 2.319 0.064 1.976 1.867 0.109
(a): Low (b): High (a): Low (b): High (a): Low (b): High
di¤. dist. di¤. dist. (a) - (b) di¤. dist. di¤. dist. (a) - (b) di¤. dist. di¤. dist. (a) - (b)
Male 0.253 0.248 0.005 0.43 0.466 -0.036 0.295 0.341 -0.046
Age 81.084 80.555 0.529 68.624 68.499 0.125 70.634 69.884 0.75
Elix. comorb. 0.267 0.333 -0.066 0.055 0.066 -0.011 0.054 0.073 -0.019
N. of interv. 2.779 2.7 0.079 2.44 2.245 0.195 1.909 1.877 0.032
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Table 2. First-stage regression. Probability of choosing a private hospital (OLS)
Dependent variable: patient is treated in a private hospital
Sample used: AMI Bypass Isc. stroke Hem. stroke Hip fracture Hip repl. Knee repl.
Dist. nearest public 0.0174 0.0172 0.0201 0.0142 0.0233 0.0183 0.0123
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0011] [0.0106] [0.0005] [0.0001] [0.0008]
Dist. nearest public2 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0001
[0.2007] [0.0270] [0.1987] [0.2893] [0.0716] [0.0220] [0.3819]
Dist. nearest private -0.0218 -0.0173 -0.0249 -0.0187 -0.0279 -0.0153 -0.0172
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Dist. nearest private2 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002
[0.0001] [0.0207] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0008] [0.0001]
Male -0.0018 -0.0084 0.0044 0.0155 -0.0056 -0.0197 -0.0082
[0.7232] [0.5096] [0.3420] [0.0286] [0.3721] [0.0017] [0.1820]
Age group 40-60 -0.0229 0.0424 0.0434 -0.0106 0.0137 0.0564 0.0476
[0.1647] [0.4947] [0.0312] [0.7330] [0.6105] [0.0318] [0.4698]
Age group 60-70 -0.0116 0.0700 0.0382 0.0212 0.0168 0.0494 0.0157
[0.4890] [0.2689] [0.0761] [0.5162] [0.5649] [0.1060] [0.8189]
Age group 70-80 0.0026 0.0778 0.0411 0.0154 0.0087 0.0221 -0.0014
[0.8807] [0.2067] [0.0761] [0.6699] [0.7626] [0.5248] [0.9842]
Age over 80 0.0087 0.0650 0.0429 0.0298 0.0173 0.0143 0.0192
[0.6417] [0.2886] [0.1207] [0.4431] [0.5516] [0.7035] [0.7903]
Elixhauser comorb. -0.0141 -0.0324 -0.0020 -0.0209 -0.0222 -0.2483 -0.2179
[0.3639] [0.2865] [0.8957] [0.1080] [0.2084] [0.0001] [0.0001]
N. of interv. 0.0225 0.0405 0.0076 0.0276 0.0475 -0.0021 -0.0096
[0.0022] [0.0728] [0.5044] [0.0022] [0.0001] [0.9032] [0.5809]
n. hospitals 0.0003 -0.0018 0.0005 -0.0012 0.0000 0.0003 0.0008
[0.8104] [0.0236] [0.6525] [0.2177] [0.9912] [0.8161] [0.4956]
F-test+ 784.1 468.4 166.3 895.5 179.2 176.4 186.9
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Notes: includes province xed e¤ects; p-values are provided in square brackets.
(+): Stock and Yogo (2005) F statistic.
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Table 3a. Estimation results for 30-day mortality.
Quality measure: 30-day mortality
AMI Bypass Isc. stroke Hem. stroke Hip fracture
(A) OLS estimation
Private -0.0277 -0.0047 -0.0299 -0.0677 -0.0072
[0.0001] [0.2959] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0502]
(B): IV estimation
Private -0.035 -0.006 -0.010 0.058 0.004
[0.012] [0.651] [0.566] [0.170] [0.710]
Other covariates (IV estimation)
Teaching 0.014 -0.001 -0.007 0.002 -0.006
[0.016] [0.835] [0.361] [0.848] [0.078]
Male -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 -0.006 0.054
[0.061] [0.265] [0.851] [0.253] [0.000]
Age group 40-60 0.003 0.003 0.024 0.047 0.017
[0.602] [0.342] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Age group 60-70 0.021 0.006 0.044 0.085 0.036
[0.000] [0.110] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Age group 70-80 0.055 0.016 0.084 0.142 0.050
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Age over 80 0.154 0.034 0.200 0.243 0.095
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Elixhauser
comorb.
-0.004 0.005 -0.004 -0.005 0.031
[0.122] [0.200] [0.138] [0.369] [0.000]
N. of procedures -0.009 0.009 -0.009 -0.004 -0.003
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.252] [0.004]
% private hosp.
in the catchment
0.014 -0.021 -0.018 0.035 -0.027
[0.508] [0.022] [0.609] [0.565] [0.169]
n. hospitals
in the catchment
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.338] [0.265] [0.057] [0.831] [0.070]
N 59,407 7,468 39,262 19,248 44,688
Notes: includes province xed e¤ects; p-values are provided in square brackets.
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Table 3b. Estimation results for 30-day readmission and (log of) waiting times.
Quality measure: 30-day readmission Waiting times
Hip repl. Knee repl. Hip repl. Knee repl.
(A) OLS estimation
Private 0.0024 -0.0006 -0.2488 -0.3530
[0.4015] [0.8252] [0.0001] [0.0000]
(B): IV estimation
Private 0.036 -0.009 0.256 0.216
[0.032] [0.585] [0.118] [0.168]
Other covariates (IV estimation)
Teaching -0.003 -0.002 0.279 0.286
[0.450] [0.658] [0.001] [0.001]
Male 0.001 0.007 -0.010 -0.031
[0.797] [0.009] [0.385] [0.009]
Age group 40-60 -0.002 -0.010 0.065 0.212
[0.854] [0.649] [0.150] [0.045]
Age group 60-70 -0.004 -0.025 0.022 0.321
[0.624] [0.273] [0.651] [0.003]
Age group 70-80 0.005 -0.028 -0.012 0.333
[0.572] [0.221] [0.805] [0.002]
Age over 80 0.003 -0.026 -0.145 0.250
[0.715] [0.251] [0.004] [0.019]
Elixhauser
comorb.
0.008 0.003 0.052 0.020
[0.184] [0.679] [0.414] [0.692]
N. of procedures 0.005 0.002 -0.072 -0.016
[0.000] [0.119] [0.000] [0.434]
% private hosp.
in the catchment
-0.018 -0.017 0.122 0.183
[0.300] [0.300] [0.352] [0.201]
n. hospitals
in the catchment
0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.002
[0.162] [0.755] [0.068] [0.218]
N 25,706 25,214 25,706 25,214
Notes: p-values are provided in square brackets. Waiting times are in log.
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7 APPENDIX
Table A1: Estimation results for mortality and readmissions. Logit.
Quality measure: 30-day mortality 30-day readmission
AMI Bypass Isc. stroke Hem. stroke Hip fracture Hip repl. Knee repl.
Logit estimation
Private -0.3912 -0.5021 -0.2903 -0.4179 -0.1460 0.0620 -0.0207
[0.0000] [0.2420] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0502] [0.4220] [0.8014]
IV estimation (Logit + Logit)
Private -0.417 -0.958 -0.056 -0.308 0.107 0.966 -0.403
[0.0343] [0.3522] [0.7183] [0.2233] [0.5906] [0.0326] [0.3828]
Notes: p-values are provided in square brackets.
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ICD-9-CM codes by quality indicator
1) AMI: diagnosis codes 410.xx;
2) Coronary bypass: procedure codes 36.10-36.19, excluding procedure codes 33.5, 33.6, 35,
36.9, 37.10, 37.11, 37.31, 37.32, 37.33, 37.4, 37.5, 38.04, 38.05, 38.14, 38.15, 38.34, 38.35, 38.45,
38.65, 38.85, 39.21, 39.22, 39.23, 39.54 in any procedure eld;
3) Ischaemic stroke: diagnosis codes 433.x1, 434.x1, 436, excluding codes 430, 431, 432.X in
any diagnosis eld;
4) Haemorragic stroke: diagnosis code 430, excluding codes 439 - 455 in any diagnosis eld;
5) Hip fracture: diagnosis codes 820.0-820.9;
6) Hip replacement: intervention code 81.51, excluding codes 800 - 959.9 in any diagnosis eld;
7) Knee replacement: intervention code 81.54, excluding codes 800 - 959.9 in any diagnosis eld.
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